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Re: Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 
Utah Supreme Court No. 860331 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
By letter dated March 6, 1990f Colman replied to the State 
Respondents' recent citation of Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. 
Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). 
Colman1s reply is fundamentally wrong. First, it tries to 
distinguish our case by saying: "Flying Diamond is an appeal of 
a judgment rendered after a trial." We cannot see what dif-
ference that makes. 
Flying Diamond shows that no remand is necessary if the case 
can be decided as a matter of law on undisputed record evidence. 
776 P.2d at 622. That is only reasonable. Andr logicallyf that 
principle applies regardless of how the record was generated (by 
trial or otherwise), so long as each party had fair opportunity 
to rebut the other's evidence. The principle is the same in 
either event. We think Colmanfs distinction is without meaning, 
relevance or merit. 
Besides, the asserted distinction does not exist here. 
Colman wants to distinguish our case on the basis that Flying 
Diamond had a bench trial. But Judge Banks also conducted a full 
evidentiary hearing in our case. In that hearing, each party's 
case was cross-examined; and that is where much of the record was 
developed. There is no distinction here. We think the rule 
from Flying Diamond applies in our case with full force. 
Colman also alleges, "The material facts were disputed at 
that hearing * * *." We strongly disagree. The evidence we 
refer to was not disputed. For example, as Colman admitted, his 
application to appropriate water had lapsed for lack of proof 
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that he had ever put the water to use. (Without a water right, 
he could not divert water from the Lake, and therefore his 
"ditch" had no function and his business no value.) Alsof the 
undisputed evidence was that, opposite the breach site, Colman 
had no ditch. Colman could not contradict that evidence. 
Indeed, he admitted he had not dredged the ditch in years. And 
his expert admitted Colmanfs ditch could have eroded away in the 
months and years before the Causeway was breached, as the wind 
and water rose up around the ditch. 
Such undisputed evidence leaves Colman without a case. The 
law cannot sustain Colmanfs "takings" claim if undisputed facts 
show he had nothing to take. 
A similar example is the lease agreement. The Court can 
read and interpret the agreement as a matter of law. If, ..as we 
believe, the agreement allows the State to take action such as 
breaching the Causeway, Colman has no claim as a matter of law. 
Finally, while the Complaint's material allegations of fact 
are accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the 
same is not true for its conclusions of law. Besides, we are far 
beyond the mere allegations of the Complaint. These parties have 
litigated this matter in open court; there is an evidentiary 
record; and the undisputed evidence proves Colman cannot state a 
claim as a matter of law. 
For the reasons given in our briefs, and also by virtue of 
Flying Diamond, this case can be decided as a matter of law on 
the present record. 
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